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Abstract
We show that both cooperative and non-cooperative game models can sub-
stantially increase our understanding of the functioning of actual markets. In the
ﬁrst part of the paper, we provide a brief historical sketch of the diﬀerences and
complementary between the two types of models, by going back to the work of
the founding fathers, Von Neumann, Morgenstern and Nash. In the second part,
we illustrate our main point by means of examples of bargaining, oligopolistic
interaction and auctions.
1 Introduction
Based on the assumption that players behave rationally, game theory tries to predict
the outcome in interactive decision situations, i.e. situations in which the outcome is
determined by the actions of all players and no player has full control. The theory
distinguishes between two types of models, cooperative and non-cooperative. In models
of the latter type, emphasis is on individual players and their strategy choices, and the
main solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951). Since the concept as
originally proposed by Nash is not completely satisfactory - it does not adequately take
into account that certain threats are not credible, many variations have been proposed,
see Van Damme (2002), but in their main idea these all remain faithful to Nash’s original
insight. The cooperative game theory models, instead, focus on coalitions and outcomes,
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and for cooperative games a wide variety of solution concepts have been developed,
in which few or no unifying principles can be distinguished. (See other papers in this
volume for an overview). The terminology that is used sometimes gives rise to confusion;
it is not the case that in non-cooperative games do not wish to cooperate and that
in cooperative games players automatically do so. The diﬀerence instead is in the
level of detail of the model; non-cooperative models assume that all possibilities for
cooperation have been included as formal moves in the game, while cooperative models
are ”incomplete” and allow players to act outside of the detailed rules that have been
speciﬁed.
One of us had the privilege and the luck to follow undergraduate courses in game theory
with Stef Tijs. There were courses in non-cooperative theory as well as in cooperative
theory and both were fun. When that author had passed his ﬁnal (oral) exam, he was
still puzzled about the relationships between the models and the solution concepts that
had been covered and he asked Stef a practical question: when to use a cooperative
model and when to use a non-cooperative one? The answer is not recalled, but clearly
the question is a nonsensical one: it all depends on what one wants to achieve and
what is feasible to do. Frequently, it will not be possible to write down an explicit
non-cooperative game, and even if this is possible, one should be aware that players
may attempt to violate the rules that the analyst believes to apply. On the other hand,
a cooperative model may be pitched at a too high level of abstraction and may contain
too little detail to allow the theorist to come up with a precise prediction about the
outcome. In a certain sense, the large variety of solution concepts that one ﬁnds in
cooperative game theory is a natural consequence of the model that is used being very
abstract It also follows from these considerations that cooperative and non-cooperative
models are complements to each other, rather than competitors.
Our aim in this paper is to demonstrate the complementarity between the two types of
game theory models and to illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of actual markets.
Section 2 provides a historical perspective and brieﬂy discusses the views expressed in
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) and Nash (1953). Section 3 focuses on bargaining
games, while Section 4 discusses oligopoly games and markets. Auctions are the topic
of Section 5. Section 6 concludes.3
2 Von Neumann, Morgenstern and Nash
As Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) argue, there is not much point in forming a
coalition in 2-person zero-sum games. In this case, both the cooperative and the non-
cooperative theory predict the same outcome. Furthermore, in 2-person non-zero-sum
games, there is only one coalition that can possibly form and it will form when it is
attractive to form it and when the rules of the game do not stand in the way. The
remaining question then is how the players will divide the surplus, a question that we
will return to in Section 3. The really interesting problems start to appear when there
are at least three players. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, Chapter V) argue that
in this case the game cannot sensibly be analyzed without coalitions and side-payments,
for, even if these are not explicitly allowed by the rules of the game, the players will try
to form coalitions and make side payments outside of these formal rules.
To illustrate their claim, the founding fathers of game theory, start from a simple non-
cooperative game. Assume there are three players and each player can point to one of
the others if he wants to form a coalition with him. In this case, the coalition {i,j}
forms if and only if i points to j and j points to i. The rules also stipulate that if
{i,j} forms, the third player, k, has to pay 1 money unit to each of i and j. Formally
therefore this game of coalition formation can be represented by the following normal
form (non-cooperative) game:
13
2 1, 1, -2 0, 0, 0
3 1, -2, 1 1, -2, 1
1
13
2 1, 1, -2 - 2 ,1 ,1
3 0, 0, 0 - 2 ,1 ,1
2
Figure 1: A non-cooperative game of coalition formation.
(Player 1 chooses a row, player 2 a column, and players 3 a matrix.)
This game has several pure Nash equilibria, it also has a mixed Nash equilibrium in
which each player chooses each of the others with equal probability. Von Neumann and
Morgenstern start their analysis from a non-cooperative point of view, i.e. as if the
above matrix tells the whole story:
”Since each player makes his personal move in ignorance of those of the
others, no collaboration of the players can be established during the course
of play” (p. 223).4
Nevertheless, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the whole point of the game
is to form a coalition, and they conclude that, if players are prevented to do so within
the game, they will attempt to do so outside. They realize that this raises the question
of why such outside agreements will be kept, and they pose the crucial question ”what,
if anything, enforces the ”sanctity” of such agreements? They answer this question in
the following way
”There may be games which themselves - by virtue of the rules of the (...)
provide the mechanism for agreements and their enforcement. But we cannot
base our considerations on this possibility since a game need not provide
this mechanism; (...) Thus there seems no escape from the necessity of
considering agreements concluded outside the game. If we do not allow for
them, then it is hard to see what, if anything, will govern the conduct of a
player in a simple majority game” (p. 223).
The reader may judge for himself whether, and in which circumstances, he considers this
argument to be convincing. In any case, if one accepts the argument that a convinc-
ing theory cannot be formulated without auxiliary concepts such as ”agreements” and
”coalitions”, then one also has to accept that side-payments will form an integral part
of the theory. This latter argument is easily seen by considering a minor modiﬁcation of
the game of Figure 1. Suppose that if the coalition {1,2} would form the payoﬀs would
be (1+ε,1−ε,−2) and that if {1,3} would form, the payoﬀs would be (1+ε,−2,1−ε):
what outcome of the game would result in this case? Von Neumann and Morgenstern
argue that the advantage of player 1 is quite illusory: if player 1 would insist on getting
1+ε in the coalition {1,2}, then 2 would prefer to form the coalition with 3,and simi-
larly with the roles of the weaker players reversed. Consequently, in order to prevent the
coalition of the two ”weaker” players from forming, player 1 will oﬀer a side payment of
ε to each of them. Consequently, Von Neumann and Morgenstern conclude
”It seems that what a player can get in a deﬁnite coalition depends not only
on what the rules of the game provide for that eventuality, but also on the
other (competing ) possibilities of coalitions for himself and for his partner.
Since the rules of the game are absolute and inviolable, this means that under
certain conditions compensations must be paid among coalition partners;
i.e. that a player must have to pay a well-deﬁned price to a prospective5
coalition partner. The amount of the compensations will depend on what
other alternatives are open to each of the players” (p. 227).
Obviously, if one concludes that coalitions and side payments have to be considered in
the solution, then the natural next step is to see whether the solution can be determined
by these aspects alone, and it is that problem that Von Neumann and Morgenstern then
the one he is negotiating a coalition with set out to solve in the remaining 400 pages of
the their book.
John Nash refused to accept that it was necessary to include elements outside the formal
structure of the game to develop a convincing theory of games. His thesis (Nash, 1950a),
of which the mathematical core was published a bit later as Nash (1951) opens with
”Von Neumann and Morgenstern have developed a very fruitful theory of
two-person zero-sum games in their book Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. This book also contains a theory of n-person games of a type
which we would call cooperative. This theory is based on an analysis of
the interrelationships of the various coalitions which can be formed by the
players of the game. Our theory, in contradistinction, is based on the absence
of coalitions in that it is assumed that each participant acts independently,
without collaboration or communication with any of the others. The notion
of an equilibrium point is the basic ingredient in our theory.”
Hence, Nash was the ﬁrst to introduce the formal distinction between the two classes of
games. After having given the formal deﬁnition of a non-cooperative game, Nash then
deﬁnes the equilibrium notion, proves that any ﬁnite game has at least one equilibrium,
derive properties of equilibria, discusses issues of robustness and equilibrium selection
and ﬁnally discussed interpretational issues. In the remainder of this Section, we give a
brief sketch.
A non-cooperative game is a tuple <S i,u i >i∈I where I is a nonempty set of players,
Si is the strategy set of player i and ui : S → R (where S = Xi∈ISi) is the payoﬀ func-
tion of player i. This formal structure had already been introduced by Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, who had also argued that, for ﬁnite Si, it was natural to introduce
mixed strategies. A mixed strategy σi of player i is a probability distribution on Si.6
In what follows we write k to denote a generic pure strategy and we write σk
i for the
probability that σi assigns to k.I fσ =( σ1,...,σ I) is a combination of mixed strategies,
we may write ui(σ) for player i’s expected payoﬀ when σ is played. Von Neumann and
Morgenstern had proved the important result that for rational players it was suﬃcient
to look at expected payoﬀs. In other words, it is assumed that payoﬀs are Von Neu-
mann Morgenstern utilities. Nash now deﬁnes an equilibrium point as a mixed strategy
combination σ∗ such that each player’s mixed strategy σ∗
i maximizes his payoﬀ if the
strategies of the others (denoted by σ∗






−i) for all i ∈ I
Nash’s main result is that in ﬁnite games (i.e. I and all Si are ﬁnite sets) at least one
equilibrium exists. The proof is so elegant that it is worthwhile to give it here. For i ∈ I
and k ∈ Si, write
U
k
i (σ)=m a x ( 0 ,u i(k,σ−i) − ui(σ))













then f is a continuous map, that maps the convex set Σ (of all mixed strategy proﬁles)
into itself, so that, by Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem, a ﬁxed point σ∗ exists. It is then
easily seen that such a σ∗ is an equilibrium point of the game.
The section ”Motivation and Interpretation” from Nash’s thesis was not included in
the published version (Nash 1951). In retrospect, this is to be regretted as it led to
misunderstandings and delayed progress in game theory for some time. Nash provided
two interpretations, one, ”the rationalistic interpretation” arguing why equilibrium is
relevant when the game is played by fully rational players, the other ”the mass action
representation” arguing that equilibrium might be obtained as a result of ignorant play-
ers learning to play the game over time when the game is repeated. We refer the reader
to Van Damme (1995) for further discussion on these interpretations, here we conﬁne
ourselves to the remark that the rationalistic interpretation, the view of a solution as
a convincing theory of rationality, had already been proposed in Von Neumann and7
Morgenstern, see Section 17.3 of their book. However, the founding fathers had not
followed up their own suggestion. In addition, they had come to the conclusion that it
was necessary to consider set-valued solution concepts. Again, Nash was not convinced
by their arguments and he found it a weak spot in their theory.
3 Bargaining
In this Section we illustrate the complementarity between game theory’s two approaches
for the special case of bargaining problems.
As referred to already at the end of the previous Section, the theory that Von Neumann
and Morgenstern developed generally allows multiple outcomes. Consider the special
case of a simple bargaining problem. Assume there is one seller who has one object for
sale, who does not value this object himself, and that there is one buyer that attaches
value 1 to it, with both players being risk neutral. For what price will the object be
sold? Von Neumann and Morgenstern discuss this problem in Section 61 of their book
where they come to the conclusion that ”a satisfactory theory of this highly simpliﬁed
model should leave the entire interval (i.e. in this case [0,1]) availabel for p”. (p. 557)
The above is unsatisfactory to Nash. In Nash (1950b), he writes
”In Theory of Games and Economic Behavior at h e o r yo fn-person games is
developed which includes as a special case the two-person bargaining prob-
lem. But the theory developed there makes no attempt to ﬁnd a value for a
given n-person game, that is, to determine what it is worth to each player
to have the opportunity to engage in the game (...) It is our opinion that
these n-person games should have values.”
Nash then postulates that a value exists and he sets out to identify it. To do so, he uses
the axiomatic method, that is
”One states as axioms several properties that it would seem natural for the
solution to have and then one discovers that the axioms actually determine
the solution uniquely” (Nash, 1953, p. 129)8
In his 1950b paper, Nash adopts the cooperative approach, hence, he assumes that the
solution can be identiﬁed by using only information about what outcomes and coalitions
are possible. Without loss of generality, let us normalize payoﬀs such that each player
has payoﬀ 0 if players do not cooperate and that cooperation pays, i.e. there is at least
one payoﬀ vector u with u1,u 2 > 0 that is feasible. In this case, the solution then should
just depend on the set of payoﬀs that are possible when players do cooperate. Let us
write f(S) for the solution when this set is S. This set will be convex, as players can
randomize. Obviously, such trivialities as f(S) ∈ S and fi(S)  0 for i =1 ,2 should
be satisﬁed. In addition, the solution should be independent of which utility function
is used to represent the given players preferences and should be symmetric (u1 = u2)
when the game is symmetric. All these things are undebatable. It is quite remarkable
that only one additional axiom is needed to uniquely determine the solution for each
bargaining problem. This is the Axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives:
If S ⊂ T and f(T) ∈ S,t h e nf(S)=f(T)
Again the proof of this major result is so elegant, that we cannot resist to give it. Deﬁne
g(S) as that point in S that maximizes u1u2 in S∩R2
+. Then by rescaling utilities we may
assume g(S)=( 1 ,1), and it follows that the line u2+u2 =2is a supporting hyperplane
for S at (1,1). (It separates the convex set S from the convex set {(u1,u 2);u1u2  1}.)
Now let T be the set {(u1,u 2) ∈ R2
+;u1 + u2  2}. Then, by symmetry, f(T)=( 1 ,1),
hence IIA implies f(S)=( 1 ,1). We have, therefore, established that there is only
one solution satisfying the IIA axiom: it is the point where the product of the players’
utilities is maximized. As a corollary we obtain that, in the simple seller-buyer example
that we started out with, the solution is a price of 1
2.
One interpretation of the above solution is that it will result when players can bargain
freely. Obviously, when the players would be severely restricted in their bargaining
possibilities then a diﬀerent outcome may result. For example, in the above buyer-seller
game, if the seller can make a take it or leave it oﬀer, the buyer will be forced to pay
a price of (almost) one. The advantage of non-cooperative modelling is that it allows
to analyze each speciﬁc bargaining procedure and to predict the outcome on the basis
of detailed modelling of the rules; the drawback (or realism?) of that model is that
the outcome may crucially depend on these details. Indeed, if, in our simple example,
the buyer would have all the bargaining power, the price would be (close to) zero.
The symmetry assumption in Nash’s axiomatic model represents something like players
having equal bargaining power and this is obviously violated in these take it or leave it9
games. It is not clear how such asymmetric games could be relevant for players that are
otherwise completely symmetric. Nash (1953) contains important modelling advise for
non-cooperative game theorists. He writes that in the non-cooperative approach
”the cooperative game is reduced to an non-cooperative game. To do this,
one makes the players’ steps of negotiation in the cooperative game become
moves in the non-cooperative model. Of course, one cannot represent all
possible bargaining devices as moves in the non-cooperative game. The
negotiation process must be formalized and restricted, but in such a way
that each participant is still able to utilize all the essential strength of his
position” (Nash (1953, p. 129).
Nash also writes that the two approaches are complementary and that each helps to
justify and clarify the other. To complement his cooperative analysis, Nash studies the
following simultaneous demand game: each player i demands a certain utility level ui
that he should get; if the demands are compatible, that is (u1,u 2) ∈ S,t h e ne a c hp l a y e r
gets what he demanded, otherwise disagreement (with payoﬀ 0) results. At ﬁrst it seems
that this non-cooperative game does not fulﬁll our aims, after all any Pareto optimal
outcome of S corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the game, and so does disagreement.
Nash, however, argues that one of these equilibria is distinguished in the sense that
it is the only one that is robust against small perturbations in the data. Of course,
this unique robust equilibrium is then seen to correspond to the cooperative solution of
the game. Speciﬁcally, Nash assumes that players are somewhat uncertain about what
outcomes are feasible. Let p(u) be the probability that u is feasible with p(u)=1if u ∈ S
and p a continuous function that falls rapidly to zero outside of S. With uncertainty
given by p,p l a y e ri’s payoﬀ function is now given by uip(u) a n di ti se a s i l yv e r i ﬁ e dt h a t
any maximum of the map u1u2p(u) is an equilibrium of this slightly perturbed game.
Note that all these equilibria converge to the Nash solution (the maximum of u1u2 on
S)w h e np tends to the characteristic function of S and that, for nicely behaved p,t h e
perturbed game will only have equilibria close to the Nash solution. Consequently, only
the Nash solution constitutes a robust equilibrium of the original demand game.
The above coincidence certainly is not an isolated result, the Nash solution also arises
in other natural non-cooperative bargaining models. As an example, we discuss Rubin-
stein’s (1981) alternating oﬀer bargaining game. Consider the simple seller buyer game10
that we started this Section with and assume bargaining proceeds as follows, until agree-
ment is reached or the game has come to an end. In odd numbered period (t =1 ,3,...),
the seller proposes a price to the buyer and the buyer responds by accepting or rejecting
the oﬀer; in even numbered period (t =2 ,4,...), the roles of the players are reversed
and the buyer has the initiative; after each rejection, the game stops with positive but
small probability α. Rubinstein shows that this game has a unique (subgame perfect)
equilibrium, and that, in equilibrium, agreement is reached immediately. Let ps (resp.
pb) be the price proposed by the seller (resp. the buyer). The seller realizes that if the
buyer rejects his ﬁrst oﬀer, the buyer’s expected utility will be (1 − α)(1 − pb), hence,
the seller will not oﬀer a higher utility, nor a lower. Consequently, in equilibrium we
must have
1 − ps =( 1− α)(1 − pb)
and, by a similar argument
pb =( 1− α)ps
It follows that the equilibrium prices are given by
ps =1 /(2 − α) pb =( 1− α)/(2 − α)
and as α tends to zero (when the ﬁrst mover advantage vanishes and the game becomes
symmetric), we obtain the Nash bargaining solution.
We conclude this Section with the observation that also in Von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1953) both cooperative and non-cooperative approaches are mixed. In Section 2,
we discussed the 3-player zero-sum game and the need to consider coalitions and side-
payments. In Section 22.2 of the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, the general
such game is considered: if coalition {j,k} forms, then player i has to pay ai to this
coalition (i  = j  = k). What coalition will form and how will it split the surplus? To
answer this question, Von Neumann and Morgenstern consider a demand game. They
assume that each player i speciﬁes a price pi for his participation in each coalition. Ob-
viously, if pi is too large, j and k will prefer to cooperate together rather than to form
a coalition with i.G i v e npi, j cannot expect more than ak − pi in {i,j} while k cannot
expect more than aj − pi in {i,k},h e n c ei will price himself out of the market if11
(ak − pi)+( aj − pi) <a i
Consequently, each player i cannot expect more than
pi =( −ai + aj + ak)/2
If the game is essential and it pays to form a coalition, i.e. a1 + a2 + a3 > 0, then the
above system of three questions with three unknown (i =1 ,2,3) has a unique solution.
Each player i can reasonably demand pi: we can predict how the coalition that will form
will split the surplus, but all three possible coalitions are equally likely.
4 Markets
In this Section, we brieﬂy discuss the application of game theory to oligopolistic markets.
In line with the literature, most of the discussion will be based on non-cooperative
models, but we will see that also here cooperative analysis plays its role.
In a non-cooperative oligopoly game, the players are ﬁrms, the strategy sets are, in
general, compact and connected subsets of an Euclidean space, and the payoﬀs are the
proﬁts of the ﬁrms. As Nash’s existence theorem only applies to ﬁnite games, a ﬁrst
question is whether equilibrium exists. Here we will conﬁne ourselves to the speciﬁc
case where the strategy set of player i, denoted Xi, is a closed and connected interval
in R. Hence, in essence we assume that each ﬁrm sells just one product, of which it
either sets the price or the quantity. We speak of a Cournot game when the strategies
are quantities, of a Bertrand game when the strategies are prices. Write X for the
Cartesian product of all Xi.F o r p l a y e r i ∈ N his best response correspondence is the
map Bi that assigns to each x ∈ X the set of all yi ∈ Xi that maximize this player’s
payoﬀ against x. Note that in the two-player case, Bi (viewed as a function of x−i ) will
typically be decreasing in the case of a Cournot game and be increasing in the case of
Bertrand. In the former case, we speak of strategic substitutes, in the latter of strategic
complements. We write B for the vector of all Bi .W h e n f o r e a c h p l a y e r i ∈ N the
proﬁt function is continuous on X and is quasi—concave in xi ∈ Xi for ﬁxed x−i ∈ X−i,
then the conditions of the Kakutani ﬁxed point theorem are satisﬁed ( B is an upper-
hemi continuous map, for which all image sets are non-empty compact and convex),12
hence, the oligopoly game has a Nash equilibrium. When products are diﬀerentiated,
these conditions will typically be satisﬁed, but with homogeneous products, they may
be violated. For example, in the Bertrand case, without capacity constraints and with
no possibility to ration demand, the ﬁrm with the lowest price will typically attract all
demand, hence, demand functions and proﬁt functions are discontinuous. Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986) contains useful existence theorems for cases like these. (Also see Furth
(1986).) Of course, the equilibrium is not necessarily unique.
The ﬁrst formal analysis of an oligopolistic market was performed by Cournot, who
analyzed a duopoly in which two ﬁrms sell a homogeneous (consumption) good to the
consumers, see Cournot(1838). He writes
“Let us now imagine two proprietors and two springs of which the qualities
are identical, and which, on account of their similar positions, supply the
same market in competition. In this case the price is necessarily the same
for each proprietor. [...];a n deach of them independently will seek to make
this income as large as possible.”
Cournot(1838), cited from Daughety(1988, p. 63)
In Cournot’s model, a strategy of a ﬁrm is the quantity supplied to the market. Cournot
argued that if ﬁrm i supplies qi ﬁrm j will have an incentive to supply the quantity qj
that is the best response to qi and he deﬁned an equilibrium as a situation in which
each of the duopolists is at a best response. Hence, the solution that Cournot proposed,
the Cournot equilibrium, can be viewed as a Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, Cournot’s
interpretation of the equilibrium seems to have been very diﬀerent from the modern
”rationalistic” interpretation of equilibrium, it seems to be more in line with the ”mass
action interpretation” of Nash. The following citations are revealing of this:
“After one hundred and ﬁfty years the Cournot model remains the bench-
mark of price formation under oligopoly. Nash equilibrium has emerged
as the central tool to analyze strategic interactions and this is a funda-
mental methodological contribution which goes back to Cournot’s analysis.”
Vives(1989, p.511)
“After the appearance of the Nash equilibrium, what we witness is the grad-
ual injection of a certain ambiguity into Cournot’s account in order to make13
it interpretable in terms of Nash. Following Nash, Cournot is reread and
reinterpreted. This may have several diﬀerent motivations, of which we here
present concrete evidence of two. In one case, it is a way of anchoring, or
stabilizing, the new and still ﬂoating idea of the Nash equilibrium. By show-
ing that somebody in the past — and all the better if it is an eminent ﬁgure
— seems to have had ‘the same idea’ in mind, the Nash equilibrium is given
a history, it is legitimised, and the case for game theory is strengthened. In
the other case, the motivation is to detract from the originality of Nash’s
idea, maintaining that ‘it was always there’, i.e. Nash has said nothing new.”
Leonard(1994, p.505)
Bertrand(1883) criticized Cournot for taking quantities as strategic variables and he
suggested to take prices instead. It diﬀers a lot for the outcome what the strategic
variables are. In a Cournot game, a player assumes that the opponent’s quantity remains
unchanged, hence, this corresponds to assuming that the opponent raises his price if I
raise mine. Clearly such a situation is less competitive than one of Bertrand competition
in which a ﬁrm assumes that the opponent maintains his price when it raises its own
price. Consequently, prices are frequently lower in the Bertrand situation. In fact,
when the ﬁrms produce identical products, marginal cost are constant and there are no
capacity constraints, already with two ﬁrms, Bertrand price competition results in the
competitive price, that is the price is equal to the marginal costs.
This result, that in a Bertrand game with homogeneous products and constant marginal
cost, the competitive price is already obtained with two ﬁrms is sometimes called the
Bertrand paradox and it seems to have bothered many economists in the past. Edge-
worth(1897) suggested that ﬁrms have capacity constraints and that such constraints
might resolve the paradox; after all, with capacity constraints, the reaction of the op-
ponent will be less aggressive, hence, the market less competitive. However, capacity
constraints raise another puzzle. Suppose one ﬁrm sets the competitive price, but is
not able to supply total demand at that price. After this ﬁrm has sold its full capacity,
a ‘residual’ market remains and the other ﬁrm makes most proﬁts when it charges the
‘residual monopoly price’ in this market. As Edgeworth observed, given the high price of
the second ﬁrm, the ﬁrst ﬁrm has an incentive to raise its price to just below this price.
Obviously, at these higher prices, there is then a game of each ﬁrm trying to undercut
the other, which is driving prices down again. As a consequence, a pure strategy equilib-
rium need not exist. We are led to Edgeworth cycles,.see also Levitan and Shubik(1972).14
However, we note here that there always exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies: ﬁrms
set prices randomly, according to some distribution function. It may be shown, see
Levitan and Shubik(1972), Kreps and Scheinkman(1983), Osborne and Pitchik(1986)
and Deneckere and Kovenock(1992), that for small capacities a Cournot type outcome
results, i.e. supplies are sold against a market clearing price, while for suﬃciently large
capacities, the Bertrand outcome is the equilibrium, i.e. ﬁrms set the competitive price.
For the remaining intermediate capacity levels, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Kreps and Scheinkman(1983) also analyze the situation where ﬁrms can choose their
capacity levels.They assume that ﬁrms play the following two period game:
- In the ﬁrst period ﬁrms choose their capacity levels k1 and k2,
- Knowing these capacities, in the second period ﬁrms play the Bertrand Edgeworth
price game.
In this situation, high capacity levels are attractive as they allow to sell a lot, but
they are likewise unattractive as they imply a very competitive market; in contrast, low
levels imply high prices but low quantities. Kreps and Scheinkman(1983) show that
with eﬃcient rationing in the second period, ﬁrms will choose the Cournot quantities
in the ﬁrst period and the corresponding market clearing prices in the second. Hence,
the Cournot model can be viewed as a shortcut of the two-stage Bertrand-Edgeworth
model. However, it turns out that the solution of the game depends on the rationing
scheme, as Davidson and Deneckere(1986) have shown.
All the oligopoly games discussed thus far are games with imperfect information, as
players take their decisions simultaneously. Hence, when a player takes his decision, he
does not know about the decisions of the other players. Oligopoly games with perfect
information, in which players take their decisions sequentially with they being informed
about all the previous moves, are nowadays called Stackelberg games, after Stackel-
berg(1934). Moving sequentially is a way in which too intense competition might be
avoided, for example, if players succeed in avoiding simultaneous price setting, prices will
typically be higher. Von Stackelberg assumed that one of the players is the ‘ﬁrst mover’,
the leader, and the other is the follower. In Stackelberg’s model, ﬁrst ‘the leader’ decides
and next, knowing what the leader has done, ‘the follower’ makes his decision, hence, we
have a game with perfect information.We believe that Stackelberg meant ‘leader’ and
‘follower’ more as a behavior rule, rather than an exogenously imposed ordering of the
moves, hence, in our view, he assumed asymmetries between diﬀerent player types. In
any case, this behavior does not lead to a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move15
game. The best a follower can do, is to play a best response against the action of the
leader
xF = BF(xL).
The leader knowing this, will therefore play
xL =a r gm a x
x∈XL
πL(x;BF(x)).
In a Cournot setting, this typically applies that the leader will produce more, and the
follower will produce less than his Cournot quantity, hence, the follower is in a weaker
position, and it pays to lead: there is a ﬁrst-mover advantage. (Bagwell (1995), however,
has argued that this ﬁrst-mover advantage is eliminated if the leader’s quantity can only
be observed with some noise. Speciﬁcally, he considers the situation where, if the leader
choose xL the follower observes xL with probability 1 − ε, while the follower sees a
randomly drawn ˜ x with the remaining positive probability ε,w h e r e˜ x has full support.
As now the signal that the follower receives is completely uniformative, the follower will
not condition on it, hence, it follows that in the unique pure equilibrium, the Cournot
quantities are played. Hence, there is no longer a ﬁrst mover advantage. Van Damme
and Hurkens (1996) however show that there is always a mixed equilibrium, that there
are good arguments for viewing this equilibrium as the solution of the game, and that
this equilibrium converges to the Stackelberg equilibrium when the noise vanishes.
We note that, in this approach to the Stackelberg game with perfect information, leader
and follower are determined exogenously. Now it is easy to see that, in Cournot type
games, it is most advantageous to be the leader, while in Bertrand type games, the
follower position is most advantageous. Hence, the question arises which player will
take up which player role. There is a recent literature that addresses this question of
endogenous leadership. In this literature, there are two-stage models in which players
choose the role they want to play in a timing game. The trade-oﬀ is between moving
early and enjoy the advantage of commitment, or moving late and having the possibility
to best respond to the opponent. Obviously, when ﬁrms are ‘identical’ there will be
no way to determine an endogenous leader, hence, these models assume some type of
asymmetry: endogenous leaders may emerge from diﬀerent capacities, diﬀerent eﬃciency
levels, diﬀerent information, or product diﬀerentiation. In cases like these, one could
argue that player i will become the leader when he proﬁts more from it than player j




















in other words, that the leadership will be determined as if players had joint proﬁts
in mind. Based on such considerations, many papers come to the conclusion that the
dominant or most eﬃcient ﬁrm will become the leader, see Ono (1982), Deneckere and
Kovenock (1992), Furth and Kovenock (1993), and Van Cayseele and Furth (1996). To
get some intuition for this result, let consider a simple asymmetric version of the 2-ﬁrm
Bertrand game. Assume that the product is perfectly divisible, that the demand curve
is given by D(p)=1for p<1 and D(p)=0for p>1, and that ﬁrm 2 has a capacity
constraint of k. If ﬁrm 2 acts as a leader, ﬁrm 1 will undercut and ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt is zero.
Firm 2’s proﬁt is also zero if price setting is simultaneous and in this case ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt
is zero as well. If ﬁrm 1 commits to be leader, he will be undercut by ﬁrm 2, but given
that ﬁrm 2 has a capacity constraint, ﬁrm 1 is not hurt that much by it. Firm 1 will
simply commits to the monopoly price and proﬁts will be 1−k for ﬁrm 1 and k for ﬁrm
2. Hence, only in the case where ﬁrm 1 takes up the leadership position will proﬁts be
positive for each ﬁrm, and we may expect ﬁrm 1 to take up the leadership position.
Hurkens and Van Damme (1996, 1999) argue that the above proﬁt calculation is not
convincing and that the leadership position should result from individual risk consider-
ations. Be that as it may, the interesting result that they derive is that these risk con-
siderations do lead to exactly the above inequalities, hence, Van Damme and Hurkens
obtain that both in the price and in the quantity game, the eﬃcient ﬁrm will lead. Note
then, that the eﬃcient ﬁrm obtains the most preferred position in the case of Cournot
competition, but not in the case of Bertrand competition.
Above, we already brieﬂy referred to the work of Edgeworth on Bertrand competition
with capacity constraints. Edgeworth was also the one who introduced the Core as the
concept that models unbridled competition. Shubik (1959) rediscovered this concept
in the context of cooperative games, and the close relation between the Core of the
cooperative exchange game and the competitive outcome was soon discovered. Hence,
also here we see the close relation between cooperative and non-cooperative theory.
In the remainder of this Section, we illustrate this relationship for the most simple 3-
person exchange game, a game that, incidentally, also was analyzed in Von Neumann
and Morgenstern(1953). The founding fathers indeed already mention the possibility
of applying their theory in the context of an oligopoly. Speciﬁcally, in the Sections17
62.1 and 62.4 of their book, they calculated their solutions, the Stable Set, of a three-
person non-constant sum game that arises in a situation with one buyer and two sellers.
Shapley(1958) generalized their analysis to a game with n(≥ 1) buyers and m(≥ 1)
sellers, see also Shapley and Shubik(1969). We will conﬁne ourselves to the case with
m =2and n =1 . Furthermore, for simplicity, we will assume that the sellers are
identical, that they each have one single indivisible object for sale, that they do not value
this object, and that the buyer is willing to pay 1 for it. Denoting the consumer by player
3, the situation can be represented by the (cooperative) 3-person characteristic function
game given by v(S)=1if 3 ∈ S and | S | 2; and v(S)=0otherwise. In this game,
the Core consists of a single allocation (0,0,1), corresponding to the consumer buying
from either producer for a price of 0, hence, the Core coincides with the competitive
outcome, illustrating the well-known Core equivalence theorem.
When, in the mid 1970s, one of us took his ﬁrst courses in game theory with Stef Tijs,
he considered the solution prescribed by the Core in the above game to be very natural.
As a consequence, he was bothered very much by the fact that the Shapley value of this
game was not an element of the Core and that it predicted a positive expected utility
for each of the sellers. (As is well-known, the Shapley value of this game is (1,1,4)/6).
Why could the sellers expect a positive utility in this game? The answer is in fact quite
simple: the sellers can form a cartel! Obviously, once the sellers realize that their proﬁts
will be competed away if they do not form a cartel, they will try to form one. Hence,
in this price competition game, coalitions arise quite naturally and, as a consequence,
the Core actually provides a misleading picture. . If the sellers succeed in forming a
stable coalition, they transform the situation into a bilateral monopoly in which case
the negotiated price will be 1
2. By symmetry, each of the sellers will get 1
4 in this case.
But, anticipating this, the consumer will try to form a coalition with any of the sellers,
if only to prevent these sellers from entering into a cartel agreement. As Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1953) already realized, and as we discussed in Section 2, the game is
really one in which players will rush to form a coalition and the price that the buyer
will pay will depend on the ease with which various coalitions can form. But then the
outcome will be determined by the coalition formation process, hence, following Nash’s
advise, non-cooperative modelling should focus on that process.
Let us here study one such process. Let us assume that the players bump into each
other at random and that, if negotiations between two players are not successful (which,
of course, will not happen in equilibrium), the match is dissolved and the process starts18
afresh. The remaining question is what price, p, the consumer will pay to the seller if
a buyer-seller coalition is formed. (By symmetry, this price does not depend on which
seller the buyer is matched with.) The outcome is determined by the players’ outside
options, i.e. by what players can expect if the negotiations break down. The next table
provides the utilities players can expect depending on the ﬁrst coalition that is formed
Utility
First Coalition 1 2 3
{1,3} p 0 1 − p







For the coalition {1,3}, the outside option of the seller is 1
3(p + 1
4), while the buyer’s
outside option is 2
3(1−p)+1
6. (This follows since all three 2-person coalitions are equally
likely to form in the next round.) The coalition loses 1
3(p + 1
4) if it does not come to















Hence, p = 1
4. Since all coalitions are equally likely, the expected payoﬀ of a seller equals
1
6, while the buyer’s expected payoﬀ equals 2
3. The conclusion is that expected payoﬀs
are equal to the Shapley value of the game. Furthermore, the outcome, naturally, lies
outside of the Core. We refer that reader who thinks that we have skipped over too
many details in the above derivation to Montero (2000), where all such details are ﬁlled
in.
Of course, the exact price will depend on the details of the matching process and diﬀerent
processes may give rise to diﬀerent prices, hence, diﬀerent cooperative solution concepts.
Viewed in this way, also Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s solution of this game appears
quite natural. As they write (Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, pp. 572, 573), the
solution consists of two branches, either the sellers compete (and then the buyer gets
the surplus), a situation they call the classical solution, or the sellers form a coalition,
and in this case, they will have to agree on a deﬁnite rule for how to split the surplus
obtained; as diﬀerent rules may be envisaged, multiple outcome may be a possibility.19
5 AUCTIONS
In this Section, we illustrate the usefulness of game theory in the understanding of real
life auctions. The Section consists of three parts. First, we brieﬂy discuss some auction
theory. Next,we discuss an actual auction and provide a non-coopertive analysis to
throw light on a policy issue. In the third part, we demonstrate that also in this non-
cooperative domain, insights from cooperative game theory are very relevant.
Four basic auction forms that are typically distinguished. The ﬁrst type is the Dutch
auction. If there is one object for sale, the auction proceeds by the seller starting the
auction clock and continuously lowering the price until one of the bidders pushes the
button, or shouts ”mine”; that bidder then receives the item for the price at which he
stopped the clock. The other three basic auction forms are the English (ascending)
auction in which the auctioneer continuously increases the price until one bidder is left;
this bidder then receives the item at the price where his ﬁnal competitor dropped out.
Both the Dutch and the English auction involve a dynamic element. The two basic static
auction forms are the sealed bid ﬁrst price auction and the Vickrey auction. In the ﬁrst
price auction, bidders simultaneously and independently enter their bids, typically in
sealed envelopes, and the object is awarded to the highest bidder who is required to
pay his bid. In the Vickrey auction, players enter their bids in the same way, and the
winner is again the one with the highest bid, however, the winner ”only” pays the second
highest bid
As auctions are conducted by following explicit rules they can be represented as (non-
cooperative) games. Milgrom and Weber (1982) have formulated a fairly general auction
model. In this model, there are n bidders, that occupy symmetric positions. The game
is one with incomplete information, each bidder i has a certain type θi that is known
only to this bidder himself. In addition, there may be residual uncertainty, represented
by θ0, where 0 denotes the chance player. If θ =( θ0,θ 1,...,θ n) is the vector of types
(including that of nature), then θ is called the state of the world, and θ is assumed
to be drawn from a commonly known distribution F on a set Θ that is symmetric
with respect to the last n arguments (Symmetry thus means that F is invariant with
respect to permutations of the bidders.) In addition to his type, each player i has a
value function, vi(θ), where again the assumption of symmetry is maintained, i.e. if θi
and θj are interchanged, then vi and vj are interchanged as well. Under the additional
assumption of aﬃliation (which roughly states that a higher value of θi makes a higher20
value of θj more likely), Milgrom and Weber derive a symmetric equilibrium for this




where vk denotes the k-th largest component of the vector v(θ)=( v1(θ),...,v n(θ)).I n
words, in the Vickrey auction, the player bids the expected value of the object to him,
conditional on his value being the highest, and this value also being equal to the second
highest value. For the Dutch (ﬁrst price) auction, the optimal bid is lower, and the
formula will not be given here. (See Wilson, 1992). We also note that, in addition to
giving insights into actual auctions, game theory has also contributed to characterizing
optimal auctions, where optimality either is deﬁned with respect to seller revenue or
with respect to some eﬃciency criterion (Myerson, 1981; Wilson, 1992).
In many cases, the seller will have more than one item for sale. In case the objects are
identical (such as in the case of shares, or treasury bills), the generalizations of the model
and the theory are relatively straightforward: only one price is relevant; players can
indicate how much they demand at each possible price and the seller can adjust price
(either upward, or downward, or in a static sealed bid format) to equate supply and
demand. The issue is more complicated in case the objects are heterogenous. With m
objects, the relevant price region would be Rm
+ and, of course, one could imagine bidders
expressing their demand (di : Rm
+ → 2{1,...,m}) for all possible price vectors, but this may
get very complicated. Alternatively, each bidder expresses bids for collections of items,
hence, if S ⊂{ 1,...,m},t h e nBi(S) is the maximum that i is willing to pay if he is
awarded set S, where the auction rule would be completed by a winner determination
rule. At present, there is active research on such combinatorial auctions. In connection
with spectrum auctions in the US, game theorists designed the simultaneous multi round
ascending auction, a generalization of the English auction. In this format, the objects are
sold simultaneously in a sequence of rounds with at least one price increasing from one
round to the next. In its most elementary form, each bidder can bid on all items and the
auction continues to raise prices as long as at least one new bid is made; when the auction
ends, the current highest bidders are awarded the objects at these respective prices. To
speed up the auction, activity rules may be introduced that force the bidders to bid
seriously already early on. We refer to Milgrom (2000) for more detailed description
and analysis.21
Having brieﬂy gone over the theory, our aim in the remainder of this Section is to
show how game theory can contribute to better insight and to more rational discussion
in several policy areas. Our examples are drawn from the Dutch policy context, and
our frst example relates to electricity. Electricity prices in the Netherlands are high,
at least they are higher than in the neighboring Germany. As a result of the price
diﬀerence, market parties are interested in exporting electricity from Germany into the
Netherlands. Such imports into the Netherlands are limited by the limited capacity of
the interconnectors at the border, which in turn implies that the price diﬀerence can
persist. In 2000, it was decided to allocate this scarce capacity by means of an auction;
on the website www.tso-auction.org, the interested reader can ﬁnd the details about the
auction rules and the auction outcomes. We discuss here a simpliﬁed (Cournot) model
that focuses on some of the aspects involved.
As always in auction design, decisions have to be made about what is to be auctioned,
whether the parties are to be treated symmetrically, and what the payment mechanism
is going to be. Of course, these decisions have to be made to contribute optimally to
the ultimate goal. In this speciﬁc case, the goal may be taken as to have an as low price
for electricity in the Netherlands as possible. The simple point now is that adopting
this goal implies that players cannot be treated symmetrically. The reason is that they
are not in symmetric positions: some of them have electricity generating capacity in the
Netherlands, while others do not, and members of the ﬁrst group may have an incentive
to block the interconnector in order to guarantee a higher price for the electricity that
is produced domestically. To illustrate this possibility, we consider a simple example.
Suppose there is one domestic producer of electricity, who can produce at constant
marginal cost c. Furthermore, assume that demand is linear, D(p)=1 − p. If the
domestic producer is shielded from competition, and is not regulated, he will produce
the monopoly quantity qm, found by solving:
max
qm
qm(1 − qm) − cqm,
Hence the quantity qm, the price pm and the proﬁt πm will be given by:
qm =( 1 − c)/2
pm =( 1 + c)/2
πm =( 1 − c)
2/422
Assume that the interconnector has capacity k>0, and that in the neighboring country
electricity is also produced at marginal cost c. In contrast to the home country, the
foreign country is assumed to have a competitive market, so that the price in the foreign
country pf = c. As a result pf <p m and there is interest in transporting electricity
from the foreign to the home country. If all interconnector capacity would be available




qm(1 − q − k) − cq,
hence, if he produces q, the total production is q + k, and the price 1 − q − k.T h e
quantity qc that the monopolist produces in this competitive situation is:
qc =( 1− k − c)/2,
while the resulting price pc and the proﬁt for the monopolist πcare given by:
pc =( 1 + c − k)/2
πc =( 1 − c − k)
2/4
The above calculations allow us to compute how much the capacity is worth for the
competing (foreign) generators. If they acquire the capacity, they can produce electricity
at price c a n ds e l li ta tp r i c epc, thus making a margin pc−c =( 1−c−k)/2 on k units,
resulting in a proﬁt of
πf = k(1 − c − k)/2
At the same time, the loss in proﬁt for the monopolist is given by
 π = πm − πc = k(1 − c − k/2)/2
We see that
πf <  π,23
so that the capacity is worth more to the monopolist. The intuition for this result
is simple, and is already given in Gilbert and Newbery (1982): competition results in
a lower price; this price is relevant for all units that one produces, hence, the more
units that a player produces, the more he is hurt. It follows that, if the interconnector
capacity would be sold in an ordinary auction, with all players being treated equally,
then all the capacity would be bought by the home producer, who would then not use it.
Consequently, a simple standard auction would not contribute to the goal of realizing a
lower price in the home electricity market.
The above argument was taken somewhat into account by the designers of the intercon-
nector auction, however it was not taken to its logical limit. In the actual auction rules,
no distinction is being made between those players that do have generating capacity
at home and those that don’t: a uniform cap of 400 Mw of capacity is imposed on all
players, (hence, the rule is that no player can have more than 400 Mw of interconnector
capacity at its disposal, which corresponds with some 25 percent of all available capac-
ity). This rule has obvious drawbacks. Most importantly, the price diﬀerence results
because of the limited interconnector capacity that is available, hence, one would want to
increase that capacity. As long as the price diﬀerence is positive, and suﬃciently large,
market parties will have an incentive to build extra interconnector capacity: the price
margin will be larger than the investment cost. However, in such a situation, imposing
a cap on the amount of capacity that one may hold, may actually deter the incentive to
invest. Consequently, it would be better to have the cap only on players that do have
generating capacity in the home country, and that proﬁt from interconnector capacity
being limited.
To prevent players with home generating capacity from buying, but not using intercon-
nector capacity, the auction rules include ”use it or lose it” clause. Clearly, such clauses
are eﬀective in ensuring that the capacity is used, however, they need not be eﬀective
in guaranteeing a lower price in the home electricity market. This can be easily seen in
the explicit example that was calculated above. Suppose that a ”use it or lose it” clause
would be imposed on the monopolist, how would it change the value of the intercon-
nector capacity for this monopolist? Note that the value is not changed for the foreign
competitors, this is still πf , as they will use the capacity in any way. The important
insight now is that the clause also does not change the value for the monopolist: if the
monopolist is forced to use k units at the interconnector, he will simply adjust by using
k units less of his domestic production capacity. By behaving in this way, he will still24
produce qm in total and obtain monopoly proﬁts of πm. Hence a ”use it or lose it” clause
has no eﬀect, neither on the value of the interconnector for the incumbent, nor on the
value for the entrants. Therefore, the value is larger for the incumbent, the incumbent
will acquire the capacity and the price will remain unchanged, hence, the beneﬁts of
competition will not be realized.
This simple example has shown that the design that has been adopted can be improved:
it would be better to impose capacity caps asymmetrically, and it should not be expected
that ”use it or lose it” clauses are very eﬀective in lowering the price. Of course, the
actual situation is much richer in detail than our model. However, the actual situation
is also very complicated and one has to pick cherries to come to better grips with the
overall situation. We hope it is clear that a simple model like the one that we have
discussed in this section provides an appropriate starting point for coming to grips with
a rather complicated situation.
Our second example relates to the high stakes telecommunications auctions that took
place in Europe at the beginning of te third Millenium. During 2000, various European
countries auctioned licenses for third generation mobile telephony (UMTS) services. Al-
ready a couple of years earlier, some of these countries had auctioned licenses for second
generation (DCS-1800) services. In this subsection, we brieﬂy review some aspects of
the Dutch auctions. For further detail, see Van Damme (1999, 2001, 2002).
Van Damme (1999) describes the Dutch DCS-1800 auction and argues that, as a conse-
quence of time pressure imposed on Dutch oﬃcials by the European Commission, that
auction was badly designed. The main drawback was that the available spectrum was
divided into very unequal lots: 2 large ones of 15 MHz each and 16 small ones of on
average 2.5 MHz, which were sold simultaneously by using a variant of the multiround
ascending auction that had been pioneered in the US. The rules stipulated that newcom-
ers could bid on all lots, but that incumbents (at the time, KPN and Libertel) could bid
only on the small lots. In this situation, new entrants had the choice between bidding
on large lots, or trying to assemble a suﬃcient number of small lots so that enough
spectrum would be obtained in total to create a viable national network. The latter
strategy was risky. First of all, by bidding on the small lots one was competing with
the incumbents. Secondly, one faced the risk of not obtaining enough spectrum. This is
what is called in the literature ”the exposure problem”: if say 6 small lots were needed
for a viable network, one had the risk of ﬁnding out that one could not obtain all six
because of the intensity of competition, one might be left with three lots which would25
be essentially worthless. (At the time of auction, it was not clear whether such blocks
could be resold, the auction rules stating that this was up to the Minister to decide.)
The structure of supply that was chosen had an interesting consequence. Most newcom-
ers found it too risky to bid on the small lots, hence, bidding concentrated on the large
lots and the price was driven up there. In the end, the winners of the large lots, Dutch-
tone and Telfort paid Dﬂ. 600 mln and Dﬂ. 545 mln, respectively for their licenses.
Compared to the prices paid on the small lots, these prices are very high: Van Damme
(1999) calculates that, on the basis of prices paid for the small lots, these large lots were
worth only Dﬂ. 246 mln, hence, less than half of what was paid. There was only one
newcomer, Ben, who dared to take the risk of trying to assemble a national license from
small lots and it was successful in doing so; it was rewarded by having to pay only a
relatively small price for its license. It seems clear that if the available spectrum had
been packaged in a diﬀerent way, say 3 large lots of 15 MHz each and 10 small lots of an
average 2.5 MHz each, the price diﬀerence would have been smaller, and the situation
less attractive for the incumbents. Perhaps one might even argue that the design that
was adopted in the Dutch DCS-1800 auction was very favorable for the incumbents.
In any case, the 1998 DCS-1800 auction led to a ﬁve player market, at least one player
more than in most other European markets. This provides relevant background for the
third generation (UMTS) auction that took place in the summer of 2000, and which was
really favorable for the incumbents. At that time, the two ”old” incumbents (KPN and
Libertel) still had large market shares, with the market shares of the newer incumbents
(Ben, Dutchtone and Libertel) being between 5 and 10 percent each. In this situation,
it was decided to auction ﬁve 3G-licenses, two large ones (of 15 MHz each) and three
smaller ones (of 10 MHz each). It is also relevant to know that the value of a license
is larger for an incumbent than for a newcomer to the market, and this because of two
reasons. First, an incumbent can use its existing network, hence, it will have lower cost
in constructing the necessary infrastructure. Secondly, if an incumbent does not win a
3G-license, it will also risk to lose its 2G-customers. Finally, it is relevant to know that
it was decided to use a simultaneous ascending auction.
The background provided in the previous paragraph makes clear why the Dutch 3G-
auction was unfavorable to newcomers. First, the supply of licenses (2 large, 3 small)
exactly matches the existing market structure (5 incumbents, of which 2 large ones).
Secondly, an ascending auction was used, a format that allows incumbents to react to
bids and thus to outbid new entrants. Thirdly, the value of a license being larger for an26
incumbent than for an entrant implies that an incumbent will also have an incentive to
outbid a newcomer. In a situation like this, an entrant cannot expect to win a license,
so why should it bother to participate in this auction? On the basis of these arguments,
one should expect only the incumbents to participate and, hence, the revenues to remain
small, see Maasland (2000).
The above arguments seem to have been well understood by the players in the market.
Even though many potential entrants had expressed an interest to participate in the
Dutch 3G-auction at ﬁrst, all but one subsequently decided not to participate. In the
end, only one newcomer, Versatel, participated in the auction. This participant had
equally well understood that it could not win; in fact, it had started court cases (both
at the European and the Dutch level) to argue that the auction rules were ”unfair” and
that it was impossible for a newcomer to win. If Versatel knew that it could not win a
license in this auction, why did it then participate? A press release that Versatel posted
on its website the day before the auction givens the answer to this question.
”We would however not like that we end up with nothing whilst other players
get their licenses for free. Versatel invites the incumbent mobile operators
to immediately start negotiations for access to their existing 2G networks as
well as entry to the 3G market either as a part owner of a license or as a
mobile virtual network operator.”
The press release that Versatel realizes, and want the competitors to realize, that it
has power over the incumbents. By participating in the auction, Versatel drives up the
price that the winners (the incumbents) will have to pay. (Viewed in this light, the
court cases that Versatel had started signals to the incumbents that Versatel know that
it cannot win, hence, that it must participate in the auction with another objective in
mind.) On the other hand, by dropping out, Versatel does the incumbents a favour,
since the auction will end as soon as Versatel does drop out. The press release signals
that Versatel is willing to drop out, provided that the incumbents are willing to let
Versatel share in the beneﬁts that they obtain in this way. All in all then, Versatel
appears to be following a smarter strategy than the newcomers that did not participate
in the auction.27
For the reader who has studied Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), the above may
all appear very familiar. Recall the basic three-player non-zero sum game from that
book, with one seller, two buyers, one indivisible object, and one buyer attacking a
higher value to this object than the other. Why would the weaker participate in the
game, if he knows right from the start that he will not get the object anyway. The answer
that the founding fathers give is that he has power over both other players, by being in
the game, he forces the other seller to pay a higher price and he beneﬁts the seller; by
stepping out he beneﬁts the buyer, and by forming a coalition with one of these other
players, he can exploit his power. This argument is also contained, and popularized,
in Brandenburger and Nalebuﬀ (1996), a book that also clearly demonstrates the value
of combining cooperative and competitive analysis. If one knows that Nalebuﬀ was
an advisor to Versatel, then it is no longer that surprising that Versatel has used this
strategy.
One would like to combinue this story with a happy end for game theory, but unfortu-
nately that is not possible in this situation. Even though Versatel’s strategy was clever,
it was not successful. Versatel stayed in the auction, but it did not succeed in reach-
ing a sharing agreement with one of the incumbents, even though negotiations seem to
have been conducted with one of them, the BT-subsidiary Telfort. Perhaps, the other
parties had not fully realized the cleverness of Versatel and, as Edgar Allen Poe already
remarked, it pays to be one level smarter than your opponents, but not more. When
it became clear that negotiations would not be successful, Versatel dropped out. In the
end only the Dutch government was the beneﬁciary of Versatel’s strategy.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have attempted to show that the cooperative and non-cooperative
approaches to games are complementary, not only for bargaining games, as Nash had
already argued and demonstrated, but also for market games. Speciﬁcally, we have
demonstrated this for oligopoly games and for auctions. We have shown that these
approaches are not only complementary, but also that each approach may give essential
insights into the situation and that, by combining insights from both vantage points, a
deeper understanding of the situation may be achieved.
The strength of the non-cooperative approach is that allows detailed modelling of actual
institutions. Hence, many diﬀerent institutional arrangements may be modelled and28
analysed, thus allowing an informed, rational debate about institutional reform. Indeed,
the non-cooperative models show that outcomes can depend strongly on the rules of the
game. The strength of this approach is at the same time its weakness: why would players
play by the rules of the game? Von Neumann and Morgenstern argued that, whenever
it is advantageous to do so, players will always seek for possibilities to evade constraints,
in particular, they will be motivated to form coalitions and make side-payments outside
the formal. This insight is relevant for actual markets and even though competition lows
attempt to avoid cartels and bribes, one should expect these to be not fully successful.
The cooperative approach aims to predict the outcome of the game on the basis of
much less detailed information, it only takes account of the coalitions that can form
and the payoﬀs that can be achieved. One lesson that the theory has taught us is that
frequently this information is not enough to pin down the outcome. The multiplicity
of cooperative solution concepts testiﬁes to this. Hence, in many situations we may
need a non-cooperative model to make progress. Such a non-cooperative model may
also alert to the fact that the eﬃciency assumption that frequently is routinely made in
cooperative models may not be appropriate. On the other hand, when the cooperative
approach is really successful, such as in the 2-person bargaining context, it is really
powerful and beautiful.
We expect that that the tension between the two models will continu to be a powerful
engine of innovation in the future.
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